An Efficient Three-Entity Oblivious RAM Protocol by Qu, Jikang
Creative Components Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations 
Spring 2020 
An Efficient Three-Entity Oblivious RAM Protocol 
Jikang Qu 
jqu@iastate.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/creativecomponents 
 Part of the Computer Sciences Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Qu, Jikang, "An Efficient Three-Entity Oblivious RAM Protocol" (2020). Creative Components. 540. 
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/creativecomponents/540 
This Creative Component is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, 
Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Creative 
Components by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, 
please contact digirep@iastate.edu. 
An Efficient Three-Entity Oblivious RAM 
Protocol  
 
Abstract:  
Cloud storage services are becoming more widely used in recent decades. Lots            
of systems can protect stored information from being leaked by data encryption but it is               
difficult to protect data access pattern privacy with high efficiency compared to            
non-oblivious systems. Also, lots of Oblivious RAM (ORAM) systems developed by           
researchers are just proposed but not implemented in the real world due to high              
overheads in communication and storage. In this report, we implement a new Oblivious             
RAM (ORAM) system which dramatically decreases server storage capacity, lowers          
communication cost and reduces query delay. We also show that this ORAM system             
can protect client’s data access patterns.  
 
Background:  
It is very well known that cloud services are widely used in industry because of               
customers’ increasing demand for computing power. Cloud services provide lots of           
attractive features such as pay-as-you-go and economic efficiency. With the popularity           
of cloud services, clients also need to raise various privacy concerns. 
 
It is obvious that data encryption is not enough to protect clients’ privacy in              
accessing outsourced data. Data encryption can prevent storage from being leaked but            
the server can still get clients' access pattern. While a client tries to access some               
storage locations consecutively, the server will easily get information of which targets            
the client wants to access. 
  
In the past decades, how to solve the problem of protecting data access patterns              
has attracted a large amount of interest from researchers and engineers. However,            
most of them were approaching this theoretically but not practically. It’s still not easy to               
build an oblivious cloud storage system with performance comparable with a           
non-oblivious cloud storage system. To solve this issue, we need to promise that an              
oblivious cloud storage system has to protect clients’ data access patterns, lower query             
delay by clients, lower storage costs by clients and especially the server, and lower              
communication cost between clients and the server. 
 
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) algorithm was developed in a proposal by Goldreich [1]            
in 1987 and Ostrovsky [2] in 1990. It allows a client to hide its data access pattern to an                   
untrusted server. It basically works by encrypting and shuffling data which the client has              
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accessed. After this proposal, lots of researchers and engineers have put in efforts to              
develop new ORAM schemes [3],[4],[5],[6],[7],[8],[9]. 
  
In this creative component, we propose and implement a new ORAM based            
cloud storage system called Three-Entity ORAM. We make use of the more and more              
popular adoption of hardware or software based trusted execution environment (TEE),           
such as Intel SGX enclave, to shift the workload from client to the TEE at the server                 
side, and thus can significantly reduce the client-server communication cost as well as             
the storage-side storage cost.  
 
 
Problem Definition: 
We consider a system composed of a client, a server, and a trusted entity (TEE)               
co-locating with the server. The client wants to store data at the server while protecting               
its privacy. Traditional encryption schemes only help hide data information and they            
can’t hide clients' data access patterns. This means, blocks which are accessed and             
their order are revealed.  
In our implementation, we assume that the client and the trusted entity are             
trusted, meaning all of their operations are honest and correct. We assume that the              
server is not trusted and it is curious about what blocks the client accessed. So, the goal                 
of ORAM is to successfully and completely hide data access patterns from the server.              
Particularly, each block has to be in the same length which means the server can’t               
distinguish blocks by its length. 
We assume that the client fetches/stores data in atomic units. We call them             
blocks, and each includes an array of bytes. Also, the structure of our system is not that                 
complicated even though it has three entities even unlike other normal ‘Client-Server’            
ORAM. For security, we aim to hide: (1) which data is being accessed; (2) when data                
was last accessed; (3) whether the same data is being accessed or not; (4) whether the                
operation is read or write; and (5) access pattern. Note that we assume every data               
block is encrypted by the client and thus its content is not leaked.  
  
Three-Entity ORAM System 
 
Our System is composed of three entities: Client, Server and Trusted Entity. The             
figure below provides a brief example of server storage. There are seven buckets totally              
forming a binary tree. The tree has four paths, each having three buckets. For each               
bucket, there is an array of blocks. Each block owns data with the type of byte array that                  
can be transferred into a string. Note that the example shows a binary tree, but other                
tree structural storage (m-ary tree) also works in this system.  
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For each bucket, it includes a fixed-size array of blocks. For all blocks, their              
lengths are also the same, which helps to prevent the server from tracing blocks based               
on their lengths. Also, initially, each bucket is fully filled with encrypted real and dummy               
blocks given by the client. 
 
On the client side, the client has to store information about tree storage structure.              
It doesn’t store information about the data of the block actually because there is not               
enough space for the client to store such a lot of data. This is also why cloud computing                  
is very popular because lots of small companies rent cloud services from large             
companies which provide cloud with large storage (e.g. AWS, Azure, GCP). In our             
design, the client has to store two kinds of information based on server storage. First,               
the client has to store information about which buckets each path owns. For example,              
the client needs to know bucket {0,1,3} belongs to path 1. Second, the client has to                
store information about the location of each block. For example, the client has to know               
the block which ID is 0 located at bucket 0. 
 
Particularly, unlike Path ORAM [3], the client does not need to query all blocks in               
one path on the server storage. In our implementation, the client only needs to query               
much fewer blocks on each bucket corresponding to its path. For example, if the target               
block is in path 1, then the client might just select 2 blocks from bucket 0, bucket 1 and                   
bucket 3 for each. Assume there are 20 blocks in each bucket initially, Path ORAM [3]                
requires the client to query 60 blocks per query, but in our design, it only needs to select                  
roughly 6 blocks per query. 
 
Also, another improvement compared to Path ORAM [3] is, the client doesn’t            
need to access all queried blocks and this makes no communication cost between the              
client and the server, which helps protect clients’ data access patterns. The client once              
selects multiple blocks. It sends information to the trusted entity which includes block             
IDs (non-target and target), path ID, and operations(write or read). The trusted entity             
once gets the information from the client, it will query selected blocks on the server, and                
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then only sends the target block back to the client. There is a rule for the client to query                   
and determine which blocks that the trusted entity will need to ‘pretend’ to access. 
 
For each bucket Ni on the path which includes the target block, we need to check                
every block in Ni with three statuses: denoted as 0,1,2. If status is 0 means this block                 
has never been accessed, which means the trusted entity never accessed this block             
and the client never selected it. If status is 1 means this block has been queried as a                  
target before. If status is 2 means this block has been queried before but never a target.                 
Δ here denotes each set in Ni and δ denotes the size of each set. The rule of query is                    
shown in the figure below. 
 
 
 
At the beginning, the client, based on the rule of query, selects multiple blocks,              
denoted as an array of block ID, {i1,i2,i3…,target ID}. Then, the client sends this              
information to the trusted entity, also, with the path ID and operation(read or write).              
Once the trusted entity hears the request from the client, it will query required blocks               
from the server and send the data of the target block to the client and wait for the                  
client’s operation to be done. If it’s read operation, when the client finishes operation              
and sends the target block back to the trusted entity, the trusted entity does not have to                 
do anything but only store it in local storage of itself. If it’s write operation, when the                 
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client finishes operation and sends the target block back to the trusted entity, the trusted               
entity has to encrypt the target block and store it in local storage of itself because the                 
data is changed actually after the client's writing. We assume the client and the trusted               
entity share the key of encryption algorithm so that we can ensure the correctness of               
this system. In each process of query, after the trusted entity queries every target block,               
it has to make it into a dummy block at its original position in server storage because                 
when the trusted entity puts every target block back the server, it needs to set each                
target a new random position. 
 
After N queries by the client, the trusted entity will store N blocks which are               
targets. Then, the trusted entity has to evict all blocks which are in one path back to the                  
server. For every target stored on the trusted entity side, the trusted entity randomly              
generates a new path for it, and then from the root to the leaf on the path, finds an                   
empty slot and puts the target on it. The eviction path is reverse lexicographic order and                
it’s shown in the figure below. 
 
 
 
During the eviction process, the trusted entity needs to update target blocks’            
position and store these information because after eviction to be done, the trusted entity              
has to notify the client the updated target blocks’ position so that the client can find them                 
correctly if needed in the future. 
 
Finally, the client will update information responded from the trusted entity and            
the whole process of our ORAM protocol is shown as a flowchart in the below figure. In                 
order to make it clear, there will be another figure showing the proposed system              
architecture after the flowchart followed by the flowchart. 
 
In this system, we do not consider the trusted entity’s job duty and our              
assumption is ‘Custom first’. We need to help the client reduce wasted operations as              
much as possible but also at the same time, we keep the system safe enough to protect                 
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clients’ privacy. From the process shown, we can see no communication exactly exists             
between clients and server, which meets our safety concern requirements. 
 
We assume that the trust entity can meet all requirements including enough            
space and fast computation power to run tasks that are on a large scale.  
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Implementation: 
 
We focused on implementation except for building theoretical protocol. We use           
Java to implement this ORAM system with a trusted entity emulated. Here we mainly              
discuss the data structure with some examples we use for three entities to use to help                
implementation. 
On the server side, there’s not many things we need to do. We only need to store                 
blocks in every bucket. Here, we use array implementation to implement tree structure             
because of lower space cost. In the real world, identically, on the server side, there               
should be nothing at the beginning, and clients continuously store blocks into the server              
but in this implementation, in order to make the system convenient and test the              
algorithm easily, we initially store blocks in the server storage. 
Since the array is 0-index based data structure, so Bucket {0} is the root of the                 
tree storage. Assume we are trying to implement a binary tree structure, then if the root                
bucket ID is n, the left child bucket ID will be 2n+1, and the right child bucket ID will be                    
2n+2. The basic tree storage structure with n buckets is shown as below clearly. 
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On the client side, in order to improve amortized efficiency, we need to do              
preprocessing work to help the client get information about tree storage structure            
directly. Also, we need to pay attention that the client needs to get all information as                
efficiently as possible including (1) If we know the path ID, the client can find all buckets                 
on this path. (2) If we know the block ID, the client can find which bucket does this block                   
locate at. (3) if we know the bucket ID, the client can directly find which path it is located                   
on. (4) If we know the bucket ID, the client directly can find which blocks are located at                  
it. In order to meet these four requirements, we have to implement four storage data               
structures to save these information. First, we create a map whose key represents the              
path ID and the value is the list of bucket IDs. Second, we need to create another map                  
whose key represents the block ID and the value is corresponding bucketIDs. Third, we              
need to create one more map whose key represents the bucket ID and the value is the                 
corresponding path ID. Finally, we need to build a map whose key represents each              
bucket ID and the value is the list of corresponding block IDs. Before the system starts,                
we build this storage in the client and afterward, all changes, add or remove operation               
will only cost O(1) which makes our system much more efficient compared to without              
preprocessing. Figures below show an example of client storage based on 7 buckets             
stored in the server with binary tree structure and each bucket has 10 blocks. 
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On the trusted entity side, since the trusted entity can directly access server             
storage, it only needs the information of path information developed by the client.             
Therefore, the trusted entity only needs to create a map whose key represents the path               
ID and the value is the list of bucket IDs before system running. 
We use socket programming to build communications between the client and the            
trusted entity. There’s no communication between the client and the server because of             
our system design. Also, There is no communication between the server and the trusted              
entity, because they are on the same side in our implementation. In the real world, both                
of them are on the same side either theoretically. 
System Analysis: 
To analyze the system performance, we both analyze the space cost and the             
time cost for each function done by all three entities. Then we can get a summary of the                  
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performance. Also, we analyze how this system successfully hides clients data access            
patterns by examples. 
We assume in our system, the storage tree height is log(N), which N is the total                
number of blocks N. For a client's preprocessing, the client has to build three maps               
which time complexity is O(N) because it has to check every block actually. However,              
this only happens once before the system starts. Therefore, the amortized time            
complexity of preprocessing is O(N/K) which K represents how many times the client             
queries the target block. The space complexity to store this information is O(N) exactly,              
however, for block storage on the client side, it’s O(1) because the client only accesses               
one target each time and sends it back to the trusted entity. While we consider the                
client’s query processing, we notice that the client has to check all blocks in one               
particular path, which means the time complexity for each query is log(N). Since the              
client does not need to access all blocks in one path, the space complexity for query is                 
much less than log(N), which is much better than traditional ORAM based on binary tree               
storage structure.  
On the server side, it only builds server storage based on array implementation.             
So it’s obvious that time complexity and space complexity is O(N). 
On the trusted entity side, the time complexity of the eviction algorithm is actually              
O(K) which K represents how many times the client makes requests. During accessing             
blocks on the server storage, the time complexity and space complexity are much less              
than log(N) because the number of required blocks is much less than log(N). 
Besides time and space complexity analysis, we also need to show the            
obliviousness of the query and eviction process.  
(1) Obliviousness in the query path selection. Each block is randomly located at             
server storage. Also, after multiple queries, their new located path is randomly selected             
which means this process is independent of the client's data access pattern.  
(2) Obliviousness in the block access process. For each bucket on the path, we              
need to select at least one block based on our query algorithm, which promises that the                
server won’t get enough information of the client’s data access pattern. 
(3) Obliviousness in the eviction process. For each target block, we need to evict              
it into a new random path from root to leaf. Since it’s encrypted and the size of every                  
block is the same, the server does not know the details of the block so the client’s data                  
access pattern will not be leaked to the server. 
Results Analysis: 
We analyze the result of our implementation based on different attributes we are             
paying attention to. First, we tried to see how the total number of real blocks affects our                 
system performance. We assume a client makes 100 queries, the height of the tree              
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storage is 4, also, the degree of the tree storage is 4. Figures below show the query                 
delay and the eviction delay based on the total number of real blocks. 
 
We can see query delay won’t change a lot. This is because we make the               
structure of tree storage fixed. In the query process, the client needs to traverse a path                
of the tree and nearly query an average of 2 blocks from each bucket. In the eviction                 
process, the trusted entity needs to traverse all blocks in a path and with an increasing                
number of blocks, the trust entity has to access more blocks.  
Second, we tried to see how the height of the tree affects our system              
performance such as query delay and eviction delay. We still assume a client makes              
100 queries, the degree of tree storage is 2 which means it is a binary tree structure                 
storage. The total number of blocks we set is 6400000 still because we hope our               
system can run successfully on a large scale. Figures below show the query delay and               
the eviction delay based on the tree height. 
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Exactly, once the height of the tree storage increases, the query delay increases.             
This is because per query, the client will query an average of 2 blocks per bucket in one                  
path, and if the path is longer, more blocks the client will query. However, eviction delay                
decreases while the height of the tree increases. This is because per eviction, the              
trusted entity needs to access every block in every bucket in the target path. Even the                
height of the tree increases, but the number of blocks in every bucket reduces more. 
Third, we tried to check how the degree of the tree affects our system              
performance. We still implemented this system with totally 6400000 real blocks, and we             
fixed the height of the tree as 4. Figures below show the result of our analysis. 
  
Also, while we increase the degree of the tree, query delay will not change. This               
is because since the height of the tree is fixed, while the client queries an average of 2                  
blocks in each bucket, the number of blocks accessed will not change. The eviction              
delay decreases with the increasing of the degree of the tree because with higher tree               
degree, the number of blocks stored in each bucket will decrease so the trust entity will                
access fewer blocks during eviction. 
 
Future Work: 
To achieve this implementation, we tried to implement the trust entity by            
ourselves. In the future, we might try some real industrial product like Intel SGX to               
achieve a more realistic system which can be used in some practical systems. 
Also in our implementation, we set lots of dummy blocks to make our system              
work properly even with lots of queries. However, more dummy blocks, more space cost              
that the server and the client might need to suffer from. In the future, we will try to find a                    
balance of that with proper less dummy blocks, but still make our system work properly               
with a large scale of clients’ demands. 
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Conclusion: 
In this report, we discussed the development of Oblivious RAM and introduced            
our implementation of an ORAM system with three entities. Oblivious RAM is used to              
protect clients’ data access pattern. We designed this proposed system based on            
reducing communication cost, reducing client storage and ensuring security concerns.          
Also, because lots of ORAM are just proposed but not implemented due to lots of               
specific reasons, we focused a lot on implementing this system in Java and analyzing              
its correctness. We tested our system on a very large scale (6400000 blocks totally) and               
it works the same as we theoretically proved before we implemented it.  
We learnt from lots of works proposed by former researchers such as tree             
structure storage design, random eviction algorithm and methods of analyzing security           
concerns. In the future, we will try to implement this system with practical industrial              
products like Intel SGX and also optimize the system to improve the performance as              
much as possible. 
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